Application Security
DevSecOps Review
Assess the controls linking source contributions to production releases. The review identifies where repository, build or deployment permissions could allow an unauthorised change to compromise software integrity.
01 / Overview
Assessment objectives and control obligations
The review reconstructs software supply-chain trust from repository contribution to production admission, including emergency release paths. Analysis examines branch protection, review authority, runner isolation, dependency resolution, secret exposure and artefact substitution. Build provenance is evaluated alongside the mechanisms by which deployment consumers verify the producing identity and resolved inputs.
Recommendations coordinate workload identity, separation of duties, release approval and provenance verification. NIST SSDF and SLSA provide relevant reference structures without implying certification. The treatment roadmap identifies control ownership, developer-workflow dependencies and measurable acceptance criteria for reducing unauthorised modification across the release lifecycle.
02 / Technical analysis
Failure mechanisms and security implications
A signed build provides limited assurance if the build process accepted untrusted inputs or the deployment consumer never verifies provenance. NIST SSDF and SLSA inform the review of these dependencies and the evidence required at release gates.
03 / Scope
Technical coverage and authorisation boundaries
Coverage is agreed in writing before testing begins. The rows below describe what this service normally examines. Exclusions, testing windows and escalation contacts are recorded in the rules of engagement.
- Source governance
- Contributor permissions, branch protection, review and administrative overrides.
- Build trust
- Runner isolation, untrusted contributions, caches and secret access.
- Release admission
- Artefact provenance, signatures, environment approval and deployment authority.
- Supporting tools
- Environment-appropriate instrumentation may include GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, gitleaks, Trivy, Checkov, cosign, Syft. Selection follows the investigative objective, compatibility requirements and approved operating constraints. Automated output requires corroboration against implementation evidence or observed execution before classification as a substantiated finding.
04 / Methodology
Investigation and validation methodology
Control review evaluates design adequacy and operating effectiveness against an explicit baseline. Sampling rationale, implementation evidence, exceptions and analytical limitations are retained to support traceable conclusions and proportionate remediation.
01
Objectives and evidence plan
Preparation
We agree the questions, applicable references and evidence sources, and authorise any sampling or active validation before collection.
02
Map release authority
Trace identities, approvals and trust transitions from source to production.
03
Verify sensitive boundaries
Use approved sandbox cases to examine untrusted execution and artefact admission.
04
Priorities and handover
Review completion
Factual reconciliation precedes delivery of a risk-treatment roadmap identifying accountable owners, implementation dependencies and measurable verification criteria.
05 / Assessment options
Access models and evidential confidence
Supplied access determines investigative reach, validation depth and evidential confidence. The proposal records the access model, supporting material and unresolved coverage limitations; no model implies unrestricted authority or exhaustive verification.
- Black box
- Testing starts without supplied credentials or internal design material. External exposure is examined, while authenticated workflows may remain inaccessible.
- Grey box
- Representative accounts and selected design information support direct comparison of roles, tenants and sensitive workflows.
- White box
- Source, configuration and design evidence support root cause analysis. Runtime and access limitations are still recorded.
06 / Deliverables
Decision-support and verification deliverables
Deliverables distinguish what was observed, what was concluded and where the evidence stops. The agreed scope states which evidence, review sessions and retesting are included.
Executive summary
The summary explains the demonstrated exposure, the business functions affected and the treatment decisions required, including material uncertainty.
Technical findings
Each confirmed issue records the affected assets, prerequisites, reproduction evidence and a specific remediation. Technical severity is presented separately from business priority.
Coverage and limitations
The record identifies the systems, identities and conditions tested, together with exclusions and assumptions that affect interpretation.
Treatment and retest status
Recommendations are sequenced by risk, dependency and ownership. Any agreed retest records resolved, partly resolved and unresolved issues without implying a new assessment.
Service specific evidence
A release trust map, workflow references and acceptance criteria support sustainable remediation.
07 / References
Applicable technical references
References are selected for the technology and objective in scope, and the edition applied is recorded. A framework mapping supports review; it is not certification or proof of complete compliance.
- NIST Secure Software Development Framework
- The SSDF organises secure development practices and vulnerability response. It informs lifecycle and implementation review, not a claim that every practice was assessed.
- SLSA build provenance
- The provenance specification distinguishes builder identity, build definition, parameters and resolved dependencies. Evidence must also show how consumers verify these claims.
08 / Safeguards
Operational safeguards and evidence governance
Active work is conditional on written authority from the appropriate asset owner and approved rules of engagement. The operating plan specifies permitted procedures, testing windows, prohibited actions, third-party restrictions and nominated stop authority. Unexpected instability or suspected genuine compromise triggers suspension of affected activity pending the client’s operational decision.
Evidence governance applies purpose limitation, data minimisation and access proportionality to collection, transfer, processing, retention and disposal. The signed terms define authorised recipients and any external processing arrangement. Publication, secondary use and disclosure of client material require the applicable written permission.
Conclusions distinguish substantiated exposure, untested consequence and residual uncertainty. Each material finding identifies the control obligation, causal mechanism, observed outcome and verification criteria for the proposed treatment. Technical severity informs analysis; prioritisation and acceptance of residual risk remain decisions for the client’s authorised risk owner.
Production secrets and shared packages are not altered merely to demonstrate exposure.
09 / Suitability
Commissioning criteria
Use when introducing shared runners, external contributions, workload federation or automated deployment.
Next step
Define the assessment you need
Tell us the business decision, the systems involved and any operational constraint. We will explain the coverage proposed, the access required and the evidence the engagement can provide.
- Confidentiality first
A mutual confidentiality agreement is signed before any technical detail is exchanged, so scope discussions can happen safely.
- Scope and cost in writing
Deliverables, access expectations, timeline and fee are confirmed before the engagement begins, and a scope change needs agreement.
- Answered by the delivery team
The consultants who scope an engagement are the consultants who perform it and explain the result to your team.
