COFFSec C2
COFFSec C2
COFFSec C2 supports authorised adversary emulation with an emphasis on operational accountability, campaign separation and evidential traceability. Deployment review examines the relationship between operator tasking, endpoint execution and independently observed defensive outcomes. Build-specific capabilities, operating constraints and licensing rights are confirmed during the technical briefing.
01 / Overview
Operational tooling with accountable authority
A framework supports an engagement. It does not grant permission to run one.
Command-and-control infrastructure mediates authority between operators and remote execution contexts. Deployment assurance therefore examines control-plane access, campaign boundaries and the permissions assigned to each component. Operator compromise and infrastructure compromise are assessed against their potential to expose unrelated client material or extend tasking beyond the approved estate.
Rules of engagement establish the campaign objective, permitted procedures and operational safeguards. Deconfliction preserves the distinction between exercise activity and genuine intrusion, while infrastructure governance controls consequential configuration changes. Verified prevention and useful detection constitute valid defensive outcomes and remain visible in the campaign record.
Task submission, delivery, acknowledgement, execution and independent observation represent different states. Network interruption, retries and session expiry can create ambiguity about completion. Technical briefing therefore examines task identifiers, cancellation semantics and duplicate or delayed instructions against the selected build; a consolidated success indicator must not conceal uncertainty about the resulting state.
Campaign isolation encompasses operator identities, build material, transport secrets, target restrictions and collected output. Listener separation provides limited protection where shared administration or storage retains cross-campaign access. Architecture review examines these transitive trust relationships and the consequences of compromise at each administrative boundary.
Evidence provenance requires attribution of the operator, target, build digest, arguments, timestamps and interpretation of the result. Clock uncertainty and asynchronous execution affect correlation. Completion messages are evaluated alongside defender telemetry or controlled objective evidence; an operator-side acknowledgement alone cannot establish every intended consequence.
Interruption and decommissioning require verification against an explicit removal register. Offline endpoints, expired payloads and retired listeners can leave residual artefacts or access. The closeout plan identifies client-assisted removal, unresolved items and supporting evidence. Restrictions, task semantics and export formats are confirmed for the selected build; this description does not constitute a universal version specification.
Authorisation, operational safeguards and evidence quality are required regardless of which tooling is used.
# task issued to session 01
> recon.adcs --scope corp.local --read-only
[ok] 14 objects returned · hashed · logged 23:14:07Z
02 / Architecture
Separating control, transport and evidence
The architecture is reviewed against the environment where it will operate. The components below describe responsibilities that must stay clear throughout a campaign.
- Control plane
- Operator access, task authority and engagement state are kept apart from transport infrastructure. Administrative privileges and access review form part of the deployment plan.
- Payload lifecycle
- Build identifiers, target restrictions, expiry and removal procedures are agreed before use. Platform compatibility and known limitations are confirmed against the selected build.
- Communication infrastructure
- Approved listeners and transport profiles are chosen for the environment, with documented ownership, network boundaries and handling of failed connectivity.
- Infrastructure separation
- Redirectors and campaign infrastructure are isolated according to the engagement requirements. Replacement and retirement follow the approved operating plan.
- Operator workflow
- Task-review requirements, approval gates and session context preserve attribution of consequential actions to the authorised operator.
- Evidence record
- The task, time, operator and observed result are retained for reconstruction. Export formats and protection of sensitive output are agreed during deployment.
03 / Operations
A controlled campaign lifecycle
Operating process decides what the technology may do, how activity is observed and how the deployment is closed.
01
Authority and deployment planning
Before deployment
We establish the objective, the approved estate, the operators, infrastructure ownership and escalation contacts. Compatibility and evidence requirements are checked before access is provisioned.
02
Preparation and validation
Controlled environment
The selected build and profiles are validated in an approved test environment. Restrictions, expiry and the expected behaviour of interruption or removal are reviewed.
03
Authorised tasking
Agreed campaign window
Operators perform only permitted actions, keeping task context and collecting the minimum evidence needed to establish the result. A change in objective or scope needs written approval.
04
Deconfliction and review
During operations
The control group can pause activity and distinguish exercise behaviour from a genuine incident. Operational records are compared with the evidence available to defenders.
05
Cleanup and closure
Agreed closeout
Access, payloads and infrastructure are checked against the removal plan. Residual items and limitations are disclosed, and the campaign record is handed over under the retention agreement.
04 / Delivery
Deployment and operating responsibilities
The model defines who operates the framework, who protects its infrastructure and which support commitments apply. Commercial rights follow the signed licence or engagement agreement.
- Operator licensing
- A vetted internal or professional team operates the supported build within its licence. Training, updates and permitted use are defined in the agreed terms.
- Guided adoption
- An initial joint deployment can establish infrastructure, operating procedure and evidence expectations before the client team takes over routine operation.
- Managed exercise
- COFFSec runs an authorised campaign with named client oversight, explicit stop authority and deliverables tied to the business objective.
- Hosting arrangement
- Deployment location, administrative access, retention and infrastructure ownership are confirmed separately to match the organisation’s data handling requirements.
05 / Deliverables
An operating package with defined boundaries
The agreement identifies the material supplied with the selected build or engagement. Each item is intended to support safe operation or independent review.
Build and compatibility record
The package identifies the version, supported platforms, dependencies and material operating limitations.
Deployment guidance
Documentation describes the reference components, access controls and who maintains the environment.
Operator procedures
The operating material explains approved tasking, evidence handling, escalation and interruption procedures.
Enablement plan
Any included instruction or guided work is scoped to the client team and the intended deployment.
Maintenance terms
Update access, security communications and support responsibilities are stated rather than assumed.
Campaign record
For managed exercises, the agreed output reconstructs activity and records cleanup status and remaining limitations.
06 / Evidence
Activity that can be reconstructed
An operational record is useful when it can be compared with independent evidence. It must also separate an attempted action from a demonstrated effect.
- MITRE ATT&CK
- The public behaviour knowledge base supports procedure mapping and defender correlation. We keep the actual implementation, execution conditions and outcome. A technique identifier alone does not establish complete coverage or equivalence to a particular actor.
- Task provenance
- Available records retain operator attribution, execution timing and observed outcome for independent operational reconstruction.
- Artefact integrity
- Where files are staged or collected, cryptographic digests and build references support identification and integrity checks.
- Defender correlation
- Campaign timestamps and expected observations support comparison with endpoint, identity and network evidence.
- Retention and access
- Sensitive output and operational records follow the agreed access, retention and deletion terms.
07 / Assurance
Authorisation and operational safety
A licence is not authority to access a system. Each use requires documented permission from the appropriate asset owners and an approved operating scope. Technical restrictions support operator discipline. They do not replace legal authority, active supervision or a verified cleanup plan.
Required controls
Vetted use
Access is reviewed for a legitimate purpose and accountable operators. Transfer or resale follows the licence.
Scope restrictions
Target boundaries, prohibited activity and expiry requirements are set before execution.
Interruption and removal
Operators maintain a documented stop and removal procedure. Offline or unreachable systems may need client assisted cleanup.
Sensitive evidence
Collection is limited to the authorised proof and protected during transfer, review and retention.
08 / Suitability
When a dedicated framework is justified
A dedicated framework suits an established red team that needs control of deployment, tasking and evidence across repeated campaigns. Tool selection should follow the operating objective and the capability of the team. It does not replace experienced personnel, clear authorisation or a mature response process.
Relevant requirements
Repeated operations
The team needs consistent operating procedure and separation between engagements.
Defender validation
The campaign must produce activity that can be compared with independent detection evidence.
Formal review
The organisation needs a traceable record of authority, action and outcome.
Deployment control
Infrastructure ownership and data handling requirements justify a defined hosting arrangement.
Next step
Discuss the operating requirements
Describe the intended use, supported platforms and governance constraints. We will confirm suitability, available capabilities and the applicable licensing or engagement terms.
- Confidentiality first
A mutual confidentiality agreement is signed before any technical detail is exchanged, so scope discussions can happen safely.
- Scope and cost in writing
Deliverables, access expectations, timeline and fee are confirmed before the engagement begins, and a scope change needs agreement.
- Answered by the delivery team
The consultants who scope an engagement are the consultants who perform it and explain the result to your team.
