Application Security
API Penetration Testing
Validate the permissions exercised by API callers across objects, fields and privileged functions. The assessment examines token trust, service boundaries and abuse controls that protect data integrity and operating costs.
01 / Overview
Assessment objectives and control obligations
The assessment reconciles documented specifications with deployed REST, GraphQL and gRPC attack surfaces, including legacy routes and callback mechanisms. Representative user, tenant and service principals support differential authorisation testing at gateway, resolver and downstream service boundaries. Object-level, property-level and function-level permissions are evaluated independently of official client behaviour.
Token validation examines issuer and audience binding, signature verification, delegated scopes and tenant attribution. Bounded abuse cases assess idempotency, replay resistance, resource amplification and quota enforcement. Corroborating backend state distinguishes an anomalous response from an actual confidentiality breach, unauthorised mutation or measurable consumption of billable resources.
02 / Technical analysis
Failure mechanisms and security implications
A gateway can validate a token while a service accepts an untrusted tenant identifier. Nested GraphQL fields may apply different permissions from the main operation. We locate the decision responsible for unauthorised access and examine request cost against downstream work, not request size alone.
03 / Scope
Technical coverage and authorisation boundaries
Coverage is agreed in writing before testing begins. The rows below describe what this service normally examines. Exclusions, testing windows and escalation contacts are recorded in the rules of engagement.
- Interface inventory
- Active and older routes, schema behaviour and relevant callbacks.
- Granular permissions
- Object ownership, field changes, resolver access and privileged operations.
- Tokens and abuse controls
- Issuer, audience, signature, scopes, idempotency and resource limits.
- Supporting tools
- Environment-appropriate instrumentation may include Burp Suite Professional, Postman, k6, GraphQL analysis, JWT analysis. Selection follows the investigative objective, compatibility requirements and approved operating constraints. Automated output requires corroboration against implementation evidence or observed execution before classification as a substantiated finding.
04 / Methodology
Investigation and validation methodology
Threat-informed test design aligns architectural trust boundaries, attacker prerequisites and consequential business outcomes. Automated discovery supports attack-surface coverage; manual validation establishes reachability, effective authority and the causal mechanism of each substantiated control failure.
01
Scope and safeguards
Before active work
We agree assets, test identities, techniques, windows, exclusions and stop conditions, and confirm required third party permissions.
02
Prepare representative callers
Map operations to identities and controlled records with known permissions.
03
Verify service decisions
Test direct calls and bounded abuse cases; corroborate responses with backend state.
04
Review and verification
Agreed delivery
Findings pass technical review. We explain remediation and, where agreed, verify the correction during the retest window, including relevant bypass cases.
05 / Assessment options
Access models and evidential confidence
Supplied access determines investigative reach, validation depth and evidential confidence. The proposal records the access model, supporting material and unresolved coverage limitations; no model implies unrestricted authority or exhaustive verification.
- Black box
- Testing starts without supplied credentials or internal design material. External exposure is examined, while authenticated workflows may remain inaccessible.
- Grey box
- Representative accounts and selected design information support direct comparison of roles, tenants and sensitive workflows.
- White box
- Source, configuration and design evidence support root cause analysis. Runtime and access limitations are still recorded.
06 / Deliverables
Decision-support and verification deliverables
Deliverables distinguish what was observed, what was concluded and where the evidence stops. The agreed scope states which evidence, review sessions and retesting are included.
Executive summary
The summary explains the demonstrated exposure, the business functions affected and the treatment decisions required, including material uncertainty.
Technical findings
Each confirmed issue records the affected assets, prerequisites, reproduction evidence and a specific remediation. Technical severity is presented separately from business priority.
Coverage and limitations
The record identifies the systems, identities and conditions tested, together with exclusions and assumptions that affect interpretation.
Treatment and retest status
Recommendations are sequenced by risk, dependency and ownership. Any agreed retest records resolved, partly resolved and unresolved issues without implying a new assessment.
Service specific evidence
Endpoint, relevant token claims, record ownership and request sequence identify the failed control.
07 / References
Applicable technical references
References are selected for the technology and objective in scope, and the edition applied is recorded. A framework mapping supports review; it is not certification or proof of complete compliance.
- OWASP API Security Top 10
- The 2023 risk taxonomy distinguishes object, property and function authorisation, resource consumption and inventory risks. It is not an exhaustive test specification.
- OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
- ASVS supplies verifiable application requirements. Requirements are selected for the architecture and assurance objective, with implementation evidence rather than a blanket compliance claim.
08 / Safeguards
Operational safeguards and evidence governance
Active work is conditional on written authority from the appropriate asset owner and approved rules of engagement. The operating plan specifies permitted procedures, testing windows, prohibited actions, third-party restrictions and nominated stop authority. Unexpected instability or suspected genuine compromise triggers suspension of affected activity pending the client’s operational decision.
Evidence governance applies purpose limitation, data minimisation and access proportionality to collection, transfer, processing, retention and disposal. The signed terms define authorised recipients and any external processing arrangement. Publication, secondary use and disclosure of client material require the applicable written permission.
Conclusions distinguish substantiated exposure, untested consequence and residual uncertainty. Each material finding identifies the control obligation, causal mechanism, observed outcome and verification criteria for the proposed treatment. Technical severity informs analysis; prioritisation and acceptance of residual risk remain decisions for the client’s authorised risk owner.
Provider costs, request rates and real account lockouts are explicit constraints. Discovery of a route does not establish a vulnerability.
09 / Suitability
Commissioning criteria
Use for public integrations, mobile backends and services with shared tenant or machine access.
Next step
Define the assessment you need
Tell us the business decision, the systems involved and any operational constraint. We will explain the coverage proposed, the access required and the evidence the engagement can provide.
- Confidentiality first
A mutual confidentiality agreement is signed before any technical detail is exchanged, so scope discussions can happen safely.
- Scope and cost in writing
Deliverables, access expectations, timeline and fee are confirmed before the engagement begins, and a scope change needs agreement.
- Answered by the delivery team
The consultants who scope an engagement are the consultants who perform it and explain the result to your team.
