Adversary Emulation and Response
Red Teaming
Evaluate how prevention, detection and response perform against an authorised adversary pursuing a defined business objective. The exercise provides evidence of attack progression, defensive decisions and remaining exposure.
01 / Overview
Assessment objectives and control obligations
Red teaming operationalises a threat-informed adversary scenario against a measurable business objective and explicit starting-access model. Rules of engagement define permitted procedures, exclusions, deconfliction and safe objective proof. A nominated client control group retains stop authority and responsibility for distinguishing exercise activity from genuine intrusion.
Operator progression is correlated with defender telemetry, investigation decisions and containment outcomes on a common chronology. Reporting preserves effective controls alongside gaps and identifies the business consequence of demonstrated access. ATT&CK mappings retain procedure context; incomplete progression and assumed-access phases remain explicitly qualified.
02 / Technical analysis
Failure mechanisms and security implications
An ATT&CK identifier does not reproduce every procedure used by a threat actor. We retain implementation context and distinguish verified prevention from progression that ended because of time or unavailable access.
03 / Scope
Technical coverage and authorisation boundaries
Coverage is agreed in writing before testing begins. The rows below describe what this service normally examines. Exclusions, testing windows and escalation contacts are recorded in the rules of engagement.
- Entry and objectives
- Approved entry routes or supplied access and a safe proof of the target outcome.
- Controlled progression
- Authorised movement, privilege and temporary operational artefacts.
- Defensive outcomes
- Prevention, telemetry, investigation, containment and cleanup.
- Supporting tools
- Environment-appropriate instrumentation may include Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Impacket, BloodHound, Controlled research tooling. Selection follows the investigative objective, compatibility requirements and approved operating constraints. Automated output requires corroboration against implementation evidence or observed execution before classification as a substantiated finding.
04 / Methodology
Investigation and validation methodology
The exercise is designed around a measurable objective and an agreed adversary scenario. A client control group holds stop authority, and operator activity and defender outcomes are recorded on one timeline.
01
Scenario and authority
Planning
We select relevant behaviours, define success criteria and agree scope, exclusions, deconfliction and staff safeguards.
02
Design the authorised scenario
Define the objective, control group, exclusions and evidence plan.
03
Execute and reconstruct
Correlate approved actions with defender observations and verify cleanup.
04
Reconstruction and improvement
Debrief
We correlate the exercise with defender evidence, confirm cleanup and agree improvements with named owners and verification criteria.
05 / Assessment options
Access models and evidential confidence
Supplied access determines investigative reach, validation depth and evidential confidence. The proposal records the access model, supporting material and unresolved coverage limitations; no model implies unrestricted authority or exhaustive verification.
- Black box
- Testing starts without supplied credentials or internal design material. External exposure is examined, while authenticated workflows may remain inaccessible.
- Grey box
- Representative accounts and selected design information support direct comparison of roles, tenants and sensitive workflows.
- White box
- Source, configuration and design evidence support root cause analysis. Runtime and access limitations are still recorded.
06 / Deliverables
Decision-support and verification deliverables
Deliverables distinguish what was observed, what was concluded and where the evidence stops. The agreed scope states which evidence, review sessions and retesting are included.
Executive summary
The summary explains the demonstrated exposure, the business functions affected and the treatment decisions required, including material uncertainty.
Technical findings
Each confirmed issue records the affected assets, prerequisites, reproduction evidence and a specific remediation. Technical severity is presented separately from business priority.
Coverage and limitations
The record identifies the systems, identities and conditions tested, together with exclusions and assumptions that affect interpretation.
Treatment and retest status
Recommendations are sequenced by risk, dependency and ownership. Any agreed retest records resolved, partly resolved and unresolved issues without implying a new assessment.
Service specific evidence
A procedure timeline, observed control outcomes and prioritised changes support resilience decisions.
07 / References
Applicable technical references
References are selected for the technology and objective in scope, and the edition applied is recorded. A framework mapping supports review; it is not certification or proof of complete compliance.
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Observed adversary behaviours support scenario selection and reporting. Mappings retain procedure context and outcome; a technique label does not prove complete detection coverage.
- NIST technical security assessment guidance
- The technical assessment guide informs planning, authorisation, execution and reporting. Technology specific procedures are selected separately and constrained by operational safety.
08 / Safeguards
Operational safeguards and evidence governance
Active work is conditional on written authority from the appropriate asset owner and approved rules of engagement. The operating plan specifies permitted procedures, testing windows, prohibited actions, third-party restrictions and nominated stop authority. Unexpected instability or suspected genuine compromise triggers suspension of affected activity pending the client’s operational decision.
Evidence governance applies purpose limitation, data minimisation and access proportionality to collection, transfer, processing, retention and disposal. The signed terms define authorised recipients and any external processing arrangement. Publication, secondary use and disclosure of client material require the applicable written permission.
Conclusions distinguish substantiated exposure, untested consequence and residual uncertainty. Each material finding identifies the control obligation, causal mechanism, observed outcome and verification criteria for the proposed treatment. Technical severity informs analysis; prioritisation and acceptance of residual risk remain decisions for the client’s authorised risk owner.
A bounded exercise is not exhaustive vulnerability coverage or exact replication of an actor.
09 / Suitability
Commissioning criteria
Use when the organisation needs evidence of how technical controls and operational teams perform together.
Next step
Define the assessment you need
Tell us the business decision, the systems involved and any operational constraint. We will explain the coverage proposed, the access required and the evidence the engagement can provide.
- Confidentiality first
A mutual confidentiality agreement is signed before any technical detail is exchanged, so scope discussions can happen safely.
- Scope and cost in writing
Deliverables, access expectations, timeline and fee are confirmed before the engagement begins, and a scope change needs agreement.
- Answered by the delivery team
The consultants who scope an engagement are the consultants who perform it and explain the result to your team.
