Adversary Emulation and Response
Ransomware Readiness Assessment
Assess whether intrusion can be contained and critical services recovered when production identities or systems are compromised. The work examines recovery independence, decision authority and evidence of restoration capability.
01 / Overview
Assessment objectives and control obligations
Ransomware readiness maps critical services, recovery-time and recovery-point objectives, and dependencies on identity, networks, encryption keys and backup administration. Assessment examines the independence of recovery authority from compromised production credentials. Isolation, immutability and restoration prerequisites are evaluated as complementary protection mechanisms.
Configuration evidence, authorised restoration exercises and management tabletop scenarios distinguish documented plans from demonstrated service recoverability. Findings address restoration sequencing, decision authority, communications and residual dependencies affecting downtime. No live destructive encryption is required to examine the control assumptions underlying business resilience.
02 / Technical analysis
Failure mechanisms and security implications
A successful backup job does not establish recoverability. Restoration may depend on the directory or encryption keys lost during the same incident. Service recovery exercises provide stronger evidence than file restoration alone.
03 / Scope
Technical coverage and authorisation boundaries
Coverage is agreed in writing before testing begins. The rows below describe what this service normally examines. Exclusions, testing windows and escalation contacts are recorded in the rules of engagement.
- Attack and containment paths
- Access to critical systems, identity and recovery infrastructure.
- Backup protection
- Isolation, immutability, credentials and restoration evidence.
- Business decisions
- Recovery order, communications, legal consultation and authority.
- Supporting tools
- Environment-appropriate instrumentation may include NIST CSF 2.0, Backup review, EDR evidence, Tabletop exercises. Selection follows the investigative objective, compatibility requirements and approved operating constraints. Automated output requires corroboration against implementation evidence or observed execution before classification as a substantiated finding.
04 / Methodology
Investigation and validation methodology
Control review evaluates design adequacy and operating effectiveness against an explicit baseline. Sampling rationale, implementation evidence, exceptions and analytical limitations are retained to support traceable conclusions and proportionate remediation.
01
Objectives and evidence plan
Preparation
We agree the questions, applicable references and evidence sources, and authorise any sampling or active validation before collection.
02
Map recovery dependencies
Confirm critical services and the authority needed to restore them.
03
Challenge selected recovery assumptions
Review protected copies and execute approved exercises with recorded outcomes.
04
Priorities and handover
Review completion
Factual reconciliation precedes delivery of a risk-treatment roadmap identifying accountable owners, implementation dependencies and measurable verification criteria.
05 / Assessment options
Access models and evidential confidence
Supplied access determines investigative reach, validation depth and evidential confidence. The proposal records the access model, supporting material and unresolved coverage limitations; no model implies unrestricted authority or exhaustive verification.
- Black box
- Testing starts without supplied credentials or internal design material. External exposure is examined, while authenticated workflows may remain inaccessible.
- Grey box
- Representative accounts and selected design information support direct comparison of roles, tenants and sensitive workflows.
- White box
- Source, configuration and design evidence support root cause analysis. Runtime and access limitations are still recorded.
06 / Deliverables
Decision-support and verification deliverables
Deliverables distinguish what was observed, what was concluded and where the evidence stops. The agreed scope states which evidence, review sessions and retesting are included.
Executive summary
The summary explains the demonstrated exposure, the business functions affected and the treatment decisions required, including material uncertainty.
Technical findings
Each confirmed issue records the affected assets, prerequisites, reproduction evidence and a specific remediation. Technical severity is presented separately from business priority.
Coverage and limitations
The record identifies the systems, identities and conditions tested, together with exclusions and assumptions that affect interpretation.
Treatment and retest status
Recommendations are sequenced by risk, dependency and ownership. Any agreed retest records resolved, partly resolved and unresolved issues without implying a new assessment.
Service specific evidence
A dependency map, restoration evidence and decision gaps support resilience investment.
07 / References
Applicable technical references
References are selected for the technology and objective in scope, and the edition applied is recorded. A framework mapping supports review; it is not certification or proof of complete compliance.
- NIST incident response recommendations
- Revision 3 integrates preparation, detection, response, recovery and improvement with CSF 2.0 risk management. The reference does not prescribe identical actions for every incident.
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Observed adversary behaviours support scenario selection and reporting. Mappings retain procedure context and outcome; a technique label does not prove complete detection coverage.
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- The framework describes governance and risk management outcomes across identification, protection, detection, response and recovery. A profile is not a technical security certificate.
08 / Safeguards
Operational safeguards and evidence governance
Active work is conditional on written authority from the appropriate asset owner and approved rules of engagement. The operating plan specifies permitted procedures, testing windows, prohibited actions, third-party restrictions and nominated stop authority. Unexpected instability or suspected genuine compromise triggers suspension of affected activity pending the client’s operational decision.
Evidence governance applies purpose limitation, data minimisation and access proportionality to collection, transfer, processing, retention and disposal. The signed terms define authorised recipients and any external processing arrangement. Publication, secondary use and disclosure of client material require the applicable written permission.
Conclusions distinguish substantiated exposure, untested consequence and residual uncertainty. Each material finding identifies the control obligation, causal mechanism, observed outcome and verification criteria for the proposed treatment. Technical severity informs analysis; prioritisation and acceptance of residual risk remain decisions for the client’s authorised risk owner.
No live destructive encryption. Recovery conclusions reflect the exercises actually completed.
09 / Suitability
Commissioning criteria
Use before recovery redesign or when backup claims need independent technical examination.
Next step
Define the assessment you need
Tell us the business decision, the systems involved and any operational constraint. We will explain the coverage proposed, the access required and the evidence the engagement can provide.
- Confidentiality first
A mutual confidentiality agreement is signed before any technical detail is exchanged, so scope discussions can happen safely.
- Scope and cost in writing
Deliverables, access expectations, timeline and fee are confirmed before the engagement begins, and a scope change needs agreement.
- Answered by the delivery team
The consultants who scope an engagement are the consultants who perform it and explain the result to your team.
